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ABSTRACT 
Securing the confidentiality and integrity of information manipulated by computer 
software is an old yet increasingly important problem. Current software permission systems 
present on Android or iOS provide inadequate support for developing applications with secure 
information flow policies. To be useful, information flow control policies need to specify 
declassifications and the conditions under which declassification must occur. Having these 
declassifications scattered all over the program makes policies hard to find, which makes 
auditing difficult. To overcome these challenges, a policy specification language, ‘Evidently’ 
is discussed that allows one to specify information flow control policies separately from the 
program and which supports conditional gradual releases that can be automatically enforced. I 
discuss the Evidently grammar and modular semantics in detail. Finally, I discuss the 
implementational details of Evidently compiler within the Xtext language development 
environment and the implementation’s enforcement of policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In software systems that operate on data with different sensitivity levels, the challenge 
is to provide security assurance by controlling the information flow within the system. Access 
control has been a tool to prevent secure information from being disseminated. Access control 
verifies the program’s access rights at the point of access, and either grants or denies permission 
to access the secure information.  
Information flow control monitors the flow of information through the program thus 
ensuring its information security. An ideal secure system must possess two major properties: 
Confidentiality and Integrity. Confidentiality suggests that no secure information is released to 
insecure program locations and Integrity suggests that no insecure program location may 
influence the values stored at the secure program locations. Noninterference is a security 
property that specifies constraints on the information between program locations.  
A system with perfect Confidentiality and Integrity is not always ideal when it comes 
to real world applications. For example, consider a system that provides a login prompt to a 
user. If the user enters the incorrect login credentials, the system must deny the user access. 
However, this action reveals something about what values the username and password are not 
and therefore leaks information. Such a system does not have the noninterference property. 
Since the noninterference property is not practical in real systems, some amount of release of 
the information must be allowed. Programs that release information are said to declassify that 
information.  
Therefore, the user (designer) must answer the questions such as: how much 
information should be released? What information should be released? Under what constraints 
information should be released? The answer to these questions are specified by information 
flow control policy specifications. 
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“Evidently” is a specification language designed for specifying information flow 
control policies. In Evidently, the Information Flow Control policy specifications are separated 
from the actual program. Separating the policy specifications from the implementation of a 
system permits the policy to be modified without changing its underlying implementation. 
Additionally, when policy specifications are separated from the program code, policy scattering 
and tangling of policies throughout the program code can be avoided. This feature of Evidently 
makes auditing easier. 
 Tangling occurs when the module in the application includes repeated code for each 
type of Conditional gradual release, in many modules. Scattering occurs when the information 
flow control policies are mixed with the business logic of the application. 
 
Problem and its importance 
As discussed, monitoring information flow between program locations is an inevitable 
aspect of information flow control policies. Chong and Myers [1] have described a 
declassification policy language where policies are written along with the program code. This 
means the expressions for the declassifications are interwoven with the program code, making 
auditing difficult. Additionally, when the user changes the program code, care must be taken 
to examine the complete program to verify all the declassification expressions. Similarly, in 
other specification languages such as, JIF [4], JFlow [5], JRif [6] and Paragon [7] the 
declassifications rules are specified along with the program code.  
Denning [2] presents a compiler-time methodology that verifies the program for 
secured information flow, before the program is even executed. However, statically-typed 
policy specification is not always recommended. Real computing systems have information 
flow that vary dynamically and that cannot be completely determined at compile time. Zheng 
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and Myers [3] proposed a policy specification language, ƛDSec to securely monitor and 
manipulate information with dynamic secure labels.    
 In ƛDSec , the dynamic labels can be used as type annotations to support static analysis. 
The type system of ƛDSec enforces noninterference ensuring secure information flow control. 
Evidently is a specification policy language that describes information flow control 
policies and declassification separate from the program code thereby avoiding scattering and 
tangling. Writing policies separately from the program code enables the policies to be reused. 
In Evidently, the security labels are designed in the models using flowpoints which is point of 
contact through which the policy interacts with the program code. Therefore, if the program 
code changes, only the model need to be modified.  
In this thesis, Evidently language is discussed in detail describing Evidently semantics 
and constructs. An implementation of Evidently is discussed, which describes enforcement of 
information flow policies for programs written in the Java. 
 
Background on Evidently 
In Evidently, the security policy is defined by labelling each location in the program 
code with a value that represents the security level of that location. For instance, a program 
location with a high security property might be labelled as ‘H’ and a program location with a 
lower security property might be labelled as ‘L’. The declassification rules apply constraints 
on the information flow from ‘H’ to ‘L’.  
 
Declassification 
Evidently uses Conditional Gradual Release, for declassification, i.e., rather than the 
delimited style of declassification, wherein declassifications are arbitrarily powerful 
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relabelings. In Evidently, policies may express the conditions for declassification. In Evidently, 
the declassification properties of Java program are specified by policies. The policies answers 
questions such as: ‘what’ information is being released?, ‘where’ is this information released 
to in the program code?, and ‘when’ is this information allowed to flow? 
            To be concrete, let us consider a hypothetical example of a free HBO subscription 
account. This account holds good for a month, after which, the account is terminated. Suppose, 
the user who still has a valid free HBO subscription, wants to watch an episode of their favorite 
series. Let us analyze the application of policies through this example.  
What. While specifying information flow control policy, what indicates the information 
that is being allowed to flow. In our example, the “what” could be the episode of a particular 
series that the user requests to watch, i.e., a video. The “what” could also be more fine-
grained—for example, even though, the user has a free subscription and can watch that episode, 
there might be a constraint on the duration of the episodes that user is allowed to watch. This 
information flow and its constraints are specified by Evidently abstractions called ‘Models’ 
and ‘Properties’ which will be discussed in the next chapter.                                                                                       
Where. In the context of declassification, “where” can refer to policies that describe 
release to locations in the code. These locations are represented by variables or fields or even 
various security levels. In our example, where suggests the security level say, from the 
DATABASE of HBO to NETWORK. In Evidently, the “where” feature is represented by an 
abstraction called ‘Levels’ which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
When. In Evidently, this dimension can be specified using properties in the policies. 
The ‘When’ dimension permits declassification under certain arbitrary conditions. Property 
specifications will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Considering our example of HBO 
subscription, the episode will be allowed to be viewed by the user while he has a valid 
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subscription. Once the subscription expires, the user will not be able to watch the episode. In 
Evidently, the when dimension is encoded by combining properties inside the policy.  
 
Overview of the thesis 
 
Chapter Two explains more details about Evidently syntax and semantics. Chapter 
Three discusses the implementation details of the Evidently compiler and enforcement of 
policies. Evidently is implemented using Language Development framework Xtext. Chapter 
Four also provides a brief insight about the Future work and Summary of the paper. The 
Appendix contains the compiler code to the compiler. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SECURITY POLICIES USING EVIDENTLY 
As discussed, Evidently is a policy specification language with centralized 
declassification rules that are not scattered throughout a program. This enables the reusability 
of the policies. When policies are scattered throughout the program code, any modification 
done to the program, might change the semantics of the policies. To achieve centralization of 
policies in Evidently, the user describes an abstraction of the program, which can be used 
throughout the policy. Evidently provides four abstractions namely: Models, Lenses, 
Projections, and Levels. 
Models, Projections, and Levels are used in describing a Policy, which is the fourth and 
main abstraction. We discuss the properties and functionalities of all these abstractions starting 
with models, which describes the program locations that user wants to monitor information 
flow. 
 
Models 
Models in Evidently contain references to the data locations that the user wishes to 
write declassification rules about. A model may define single or multiple data locations by 
declaring flowpoints. Using these flowpoints, models might also contain properties to specify 
constraints on the flowpoints. We discuss flowpoints and properties in detail in the next section. 
The syntax of Models in Evidently is provided in the figure 1. 
 
Flowpoints 
flowpoints are defined in the models to refer to data locations in a program’s code. As 
discussed, in Evidently, the primary functionality of models is to identify data locations in the 
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program code. A model might contain one or more flowpoints. Evidently allows users to be 
specific or generic by providing a pointcut-like-predicates and operators for describing sets of 
data locations. Figure 2 provides a brief description of these predicates. 
 
Predicate Expressions and Predicate Operators 
 
The flowpoints are comprised of predicate expressions. Predicates are combined to 
form predicate expressions that describes a set of data locations. The predicate expressions may 
be joined using && and || operator. The && operator denotes the intersection of two sets of 
data locations and || denotes their union. Figure 1 shows an example: 
flowpoint adminMode:boolean = { 
  within(AsmTrial) && field("adminMode") 
 } 
Figure 1: Predicate Expressions and Predicate operators 
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Figure 2: Syntax of Model in Evidently 
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Figure 3: Flowpoint predicates 
 
Properties 
In models, properties specify the attributes of the model that are supposed to be released 
by the policy. They also denote how much of this information is released by the policy. This 
feature is enabled using projections which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
Specification of Properties 
 
Having only properties will not make information flow completely secure. For 
example, if we have a method which displays only last 4 digits of credit card number and we 
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have defined properties to ensure this flow in the models. Suppose, if the method changes, it 
might degrade the quality of security provided by the policy. To overcome this challenge, there 
are specifications attached to the properties. These specifications are called pre- and post- 
conditions specifications. In Evidently, pre-, and post- conditions are achieved using requires 
keyword and ensures keywords respectively. 
 
Levels 
In previous sections, we have been using generic parameters H and L to represent high 
security and low security labels. In Evidently, these security labels are specified using the 
abstraction levels. Once defined, these levels are recognized within a policy which we will 
discuss in the next section. A level may be defined as a sink, which denotes the program 
locations to which information may flow to, or a source, which denotes program locations from 
which information may flow. The levels we show below are derived from Sparta [8]. Figure 3 
shows the syntax of levels in Evidently. 
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Figure 4: Syntax of Levels in Evidently 
 
Policies 
In Evidently, policies are responsible for bringing all abstractions together to express 
security specifications of a program. In this section we will discuss the policy features of 
Evidently as well as show examples of how to encode common security properties in Evidently 
policies. In Evidently, the release keyword is used to specify the actual flow. A release 
statement in the policy contains a property or flowpoint and set of templates F -> T which 
denoted the generic information flow. The set of templates, F->T represent the what and where 
dimensions respectively. ‘F’ and ‘T’ may be instantiated with any two declared labels. 
Evidently supports parametric polymorphism, similar to Java’s generics. The set of templates, 
F->T is used within the release tuple. The when dimension is denoted by the keywords, when 
and unless. 
 
The Root Policy 
In Evidently, the information flow policy of an application is not written within the 
program’s code. However, to support better modularity, Evidently abstractions such as models, 
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levels, projections and policies may be written in multiple files. To combine all these elements 
together, our system requires a root policy file, policy.epl, which is the starting point into an 
applications information flow policy. Within this file the user may import other policies, and 
set the enforcement level of the various policies. We show the syntax of policy files in 
Evidently in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5: Syntax of Policy in Evidently 
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CHAPTER THREE: EVIDENTLY COMPILER IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Introduction 
Implementation of Evidently for the Java language is discussed in this section. I used 
the Xtext language development tool [9] to implement Evidently. Prior to using Xtext, 
Evidently’s grammar was implemented using Jastadd [10]. In this method, the Lexer and Parser 
are written using JFlex [11] and Beaver [12] respectively. JastAdd, a meta compilation system 
that supports Reference Attribute Grammars was used to implement Evidently.  
 
Overview of Xtext 
Xtext is an ideal language development workbench, to implement Evidently. In Xtext, 
the grammar is specified in the ‘.xtext’ file. From this specification, Xtext automatically 
generates the parser and lexer in Java. Like ANTLR, Xtext only needs the grammar 
specification to create the AST and corresponding Java classes. To implement type checking, 
validation, and code generation, Xtext provides a structured language called ‘Xtend’ [13]. In 
our implementation, the validation checks, type checking and code generation are written using 
Xtend.  
 
Architecture 
In this section we discuss the implementational details of Evidently compiler. First, we 
discuss how the grammar is written using Xtext DSL, Validations using Xtend and, describe  
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how to enforce the information flow control policies during runtime. 
 
Grammar 
In Xtext, the grammar is written in the ‘.xtext’ file. The Evidently grammar is written 
in ‘Evidently.xtext. The first rule in the grammar defines where the parser starts and the type 
of the root element of the grammar and the AST. For Evidently, ‘PolicyFile’ is the root element 
of the AST which contains one or more Evidently abstractions such as Levels, Models and 
Policy. The complete grammar of Model, Level and Policy is described in the Appendix. 
The parser algorithm of Xtext does not deal with left recursive rules. A rule is said to 
be left recursive when the rule's non-terminal (each rule in a CFG has a non-terminal on the 
left hand side) refers to itself. To avoid left recursion one must use “left factoring” to remove 
left recursion. For example, consider the left-recursive rule A -> A a | b. This rule can be 
replaced by adding another rule say, A’, as follows: 
A-> b A’ 
A’ -> a A’ | (empty) 
 
Cross References 
To refer to another element in the grammar, Xtext allows cross references using EMF.  
The Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) [14] is a set of plug-ins available for Eclipse IDE 
that allows the developer to create the meta-model of the application. Generally, EMF is used 
to define these meta-models of the application and generate corresponding Java 
implementation classes.  
In Evidently, the root policy, ‘policy.epl’ generally contains references to models, 
policies and the levels which are handled using the cross-reference property of Xtext. In EMF, 
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the element type is not any primitive data type but, is a reference. This reference is an instance 
of EReference (from EMF). Xtext provides a mechanism to store all the cross-referencing 
objects using a structure called, ‘Index’. This index store stores only the meta-data of the object 
using IEObjectDescription elements. Xtext use namespaces to allow elements with the same 
name in different namespaces. To achieve this functionality, Xtext provides the type 
QualifiedName. Below is a code snippet from Evidently.xtext (Appendix) to demonstrate the 
usage of namespace with cross reference.  
 
 
Figure 6: Example of Cross reference and Namespace in Evidently 
 
Validations 
Parsing is only the first stage of language development and overall correctness of an 
Evidently policy is not completely determined during parsing. Having constraint checks during 
the parsing process makes grammar specifications more complex and difficult to understand. 
Hence, it is better to do as little as possible in the grammar and as much as possible in 
Validation. In the implementation, all the validations are written in the 
‘EvidentlyValidator.xtend’ file. Xtext performs validation by invoking all the methods 
annotated with @Check. Inside these methods, we carry out the semantic checks on the 
Evidently elements and if the check fails, an error method is called. The error method is passed 
with the following: 1) A message for the error 2) Information about the EObject against which 
the error was reported. The source code for all the validations is provided in the Appendix. An 
example method is showing in Figure 8 which checks for duplicate models.  
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Figure 7 : Checking for Duplicate Models 
  
Policy Enforcement 
To demonstrate the runtime enforcement of policies, we have implemented Evidently 
to work with the Java language. This section provides details on Evidently policy enforcement 
during runtime. 
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Figure 8: Enforcement of Policies 
 
Figure 9 gives an overview of our implementational details of the Evidently policy 
enforcement. Evidently makes use of ASM tool to perform additional bytecode generation. 
ASM [15] is a tool for the Java language designed for runtime class transformation and 
generation. In Evidently, ASM transforms the Java program by instrumenting bytecodes as per 
the underlying Evidently policy. 
 In Evidently, flowpoints describe the data locations in the Java program and are an 
integral part of the models. A model can contain one or more flowpoints. We used Xbase to 
map flowpoint constructs of the Evidently model to the corresponding Java model elements. 
This mapping is specified by implementing an IJvmModelInferrer interface. Since we use 
Xbase in our grammar, Xtext automatically generates an Xtend stub class, 
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EvidentlyJvmModelInferrer in the jvmmodel sub-package. The EvidentlyJvmModelInferrer 
has an infer method to create Java model elements, associate them to Evidently elements, and 
pass them to the acceptor which implements the mapping. The JvmTypesBuilder is an 
extension that provides an API to create Java model elements such as: toClass, toMethod, 
toField and so on. The generated flowpoint class contains two methods, getField() and 
getCodeClass() that returns the name of data field in the target Java program and its 
corresponding class respectively.   
 We leveraged the ASM tool to identify the data locations to instrument the policy 
specifications. The target source code is compiled into Java bytecode and the ASM tool uses 
this bytecode to inject additional bytecode to the target source code. The ASM tool checks all 
the class variables and method variables and verifies if there are flowpoints associated with the 
fields. We handle the policy enforcement by instrumenting the code with special calls to our 
runtime monitor. The runtime monitor checks the generated policy and corresponding 
flowpoints and generates appropriate code to instrument into the target source code.  
 The runtime monitor checks the generated policy file for information to be released and 
conditions under which it should be released. The ‘information’ to be released is the Flowpoint 
and the condition is specified within the ‘when’ clause. If the condition for the information 
release is not met, an exit routine is called, which stops the information from being released.  
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public class Test { 
  
  public static int secureNumber = 10; 
  public static boolean adminMode=false; 
   
  public static void add(){ 
    
    
   boolean isOk= true; 
    
   if(isOk){ 
   //Exit code should be instrumented here 
    //We should not allow this 
    System.out.println(secureNumber); 
   } 
   else{ 
    //No need to add anything here 
    System.out.println("Not an admin"); 
   } 
  }  
  public static void main(String[] args) { 
   add(); 
  }  
 
} 
 Figure 9: Java source code 
 
Figure 8 shows a sample Java source code, we wish to write a policy for. We should be 
able write a policy in Evidently which restricts the release of ‘secureNumber’, if ‘adminMode’ 
is false. Figure 9 shows the corresponding policy example. 
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model AdminAccess { 
 
 flowpoint adminMode:boolean = { 
  within(AsmTrial) && field("adminMode") 
 }i 
  
 flowpoint secureNumber:int = { 
  within(AsmTrial) && field("secureNumber") 
 } 
} 
 
policy ReleaseSecureNumberToAdmin { 
 
 use model AdminAccess; 
  
  
 release(AdminAccess.secureNumber, X->Y){ 
  when {   
   adminMode == true 
  } 
 } 
} 
Figure 10: Evidently policy 
 
We define a model ‘AdminAccess’ with two flowpoints, ‘adminMode’ and 
‘secureNumber’.  Furthermore, we define ReleaseSecureNumberToAdmin policy, to use 
AdminAccess model which allows the policy to access all the flowpoints and properties in the 
model. The release statement specifies the flowpoint (what) that is to be released based on the 
condition that is specified by when clause. The second parameter within the release tuple        
(F->T), specifies where dimension. In Figure 8, System.out.println(secureNumber); is 
executed only when the adminMode is ‘true’. Otherwise, an exit statement is called before 
‘secureNumber’ is accessed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
Evidently is a specification language that defines centralized information flow control 
policies separate from the program code. This avoids policies being scattered throughout the 
program code thereby making auditing easier. I discussed how the Evidently grammar and 
Validation rules are written with XText language development tool. Finally, I discussed how 
policies are enforced during runtime using the concepts of bytecode instrumentation.  
 
Future Work 
The current implementation is targeted to monitor the information flow of assignments 
in the program code. The implementation can be extended to track and control the information 
flow during method calls, and conditional statements. Currently, Evidently is implemented to 
control information flow in a program written in Java Language. The implementation can be 
extended to control information flow in the program written in various other object-oriented 
programming language such as Python. 
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APPENDIX: CODE FOR THE COMPILER 
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Grammar 
 
 
Figure 11: Evidently Grammar part a 
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Figure 12: Evidently Grammar part b 
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Figure 13: Evidently grammar part c 
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Figure 14: Evidently Grammar part d 
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Figure 15: Evidently Grammar part e 
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Figure 16: Evidently Grammar part f 
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Figure 17: Evidently Grammar part g 
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Figure 18: Evidently Grammar part h 
 
 
Figure 19: Evidently Grammar part i 
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Validation Rules 
 
 
Figure 20: Validation Rules part a 
 
Figure 21: Validation Rules part b 
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Figure 22: Validation Rules part c 
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Figure 23: Validation Rules part d 
34 
 
 
Figure 24: Validation Rules part e 
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Figure 25: Validation Rules part f 
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